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Setting It Right: 
Employment Protection, Labour Reallocation and Productivity
* 
 
This paper provides a critical review of the recent empirical evidence on the links between 
regulations affecting the hiring and firing of workers, labour reallocation and productivity 
growth. It also reviews how workers affected by labour mobility fare and discusses policy 
options to support them. The upshot is that employment protection has a sizeable effect on 
labour market flows and these flows, in turn, have significant impacts on productivity growth. 
At the same time, the evidence also shows that while greater labour market reallocation 
benefits many workers through higher real wages and better careers, some displaced 
workers lose out via longer unemployment durations and/or lower real wages in post-
displacement jobs. In this context, reforms of employment protection should be considered as 
part of a comprehensive package that also includes an adequate safety net for the 
unemployed and effective re-employment services. 
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Introduction 
  As  Joseph  Schumpeter  argued  long  ago,  recent  empirical  evidence  across  a  wide  range  of 
countries suggests that the functioning of markets and innovation dynamics that are at their roots involve a 
continuous process of reallocation of labour and other productive resources across firms and sectors (e.g. 
OECD, 2009; Bartelsman et al., 2009). Every year, many new firms enter the market and create new jobs, 
while other unprofitable firms exit the market, destroying jobs. Incumbent firms are also engaged in a 
continuous process of adaptation of their workforces in response to the development of new products and 
processes, the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive forces (e.g. Sutton, 1997; Pakes 
and Ericson, 1998; Geroski, 1995).  
  The  firm  entry  and  exit  process,  as  well  as  the  reallocation  of  resources  from  declining  to 
expanding businesses, contribute significantly to productivity and output growth (e.g. Griliches and Regev, 
1995;  Foster  et al.,  2001;  and  Bartelsman  et al.,  2009).  From  the  perspective  of  workers,  labour 
reallocation allows them to seize better job opportunities (e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Connolly and 
Gottschalk,  2004;  and  Contini  and  Villosio,  2007).  Notwithstanding  these  benefits,  however,  labour 
mobility also involves costs for both firms and workers. Opening and filling new vacancies is a resource 
intensive and costly process for firms; and searching for, and switching to, new jobs is costly for workers 
(e.g. OECD, 2005; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; and Caballero and Hammour, 2000). 
  While market conditions and technological forces play a major role in shaping the magnitude of 
labour  reallocation  and  its  characteristics,  a  host  of  regulations  affect  firm  turnover,  innovation  and 
adoption of new technologies and the associated labor mobility. Employment protection (EP) regulations 
and practices, is one feature in the labour market that has attracted much attention in the ongoing debate 
about labour market flexibility.
2 By raising labour adjustment costs, EP may stifle the allocation of labour 
to the most productive uses and thus hinder productivity growth.  Understanding how EP affects labour 
mobility, and assessing  its consequences for economic performance, are thus key questions for policy 
makers. They assume an even greater relevance at  present, when OECD countries are slowly emerging 
from the worst economic crisis of the past 50 years. The crisis has brought in its train large, but also greatly 
differentiated, job losses across countries (OECD, 2010), and these cross-country differences have often 
been ascribed to differences in the institutional settings, including the dismissal costs associated with EP.  
  There is a large literature, reaching back to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and the OECD 
Jobs Study of 1994 which seeks to assess the impact of EP on employment and unemployment rates across 
countries (e.g. Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Baker et al. 2005, Fiori et al. 
2007).  This literature has, however, paid little attention to any possible links between EP and productivity 
growth, and to labour mobility as the key transmission mechanism between the two.   
  Indeed,  the  knowledge  base  for  assessing  the  links  between  employment  protection,  labour 
mobility and productivity growth is still limited. It is true that several models have provided theoretical 
foundations for the possible links between EP, labour mobility and productivity growth (e.g. Bentolila and 
Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993). However, until recently, the empirical 
                                                       
2.  Another is the web of regulations governing product markets, which has been shown in a number of studies 
to  interact  with  EP  and  other  labour  market  institutions  and  policies  in  determining  labour  market 
dynamics, innovation and productivity (see e.g. OECD, 2007; Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003, 2005). The 
focus of this paper, however, is mainly on the role of EP given the preminence this has achieved in the 
debate on labour market flexibility   3 
evidence on these links was scant, largely constrained by the limited availability of comparable cross-
country data on firm and labour turnover.
3   
  This paper provides a critical review of the  recent empirical evidence on the effects of EP on 
labour reallocation and productivity growth drawing heavily on recent OECD work. Section 1 presents the 
OECD indicators of employment protection and discusses reforms of regulations affecting regular and 
temporary workers over the past two decades. Section 2 p rovides some stylized facts on job and worker 
flows in OECD countries and shows that, while sizeable everywhere, there is much cross-country variation 
in these flows. In some countries, annual job and worker reallocation s are as large as 25% and 45%, 
respectively, of dependent employment. By contrast, in a number of other countries, less than 15% of jobs 
are created and/or destroyed, and about 25% of all workers are hired or separate from their employer in a 
given year  (Bartelsman  et al.,  2009,  OECD,  2009).  This  suggests  that  country-specific  policies  and 
institutions can play an important role in determining the levels of job and worker reallocation, abstracting 
from the state of the business cycle. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the key theoretical models that 
have explored the links between labour adjustment costs, labour mobility and productivity.  
  In the following sections, we review the empirical evidence on the nexus between employment 
protection, labour reallocation and productivity, proceeding in three steps. First, we review the empirical 
evidence on the role that the reallocation of labour across firms plays for productivity growth (Section 4). 
While this evidence was, until recently, mainly confined to single-country studies – largely focusing on the 
United  States – over  the  past  few  years  several  studies  have  provided  comparative  analyses,  using 
harmonized data from a range of OECD countries. Second, we look at the empirical evidence on the effects 
of EP on labour reallocation (Section 5) and on productivity growth (Section 6). Third, we discuss how 
different  workers  affected  by  labour  mobility  fare  (Section  7).  The  concluding  section  considers  the 
implications of the evidence for policy.  
1.  Employment Protection in OECD countries 
  Employment protection usually refers to the rules and procedures governing the dismissal of 
individuals or groups of workers or the hiring of workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency (TWA) 
contracts.  Employment  protection  for  regular  contracts  typically  defines  conditions  governing  the 
termination of employment. In particular, they set procedures that have to be followed by firms when they 
initiate a dismissal process, including the notification and involvement of third parties (such as courts, 
labour inspectorates, works‟ councils, etc.); the notice periods and severance pay, which generally vary by 
tenure of the employee; and the conditions under which it is possible to lay off an individual employee 
(fair  dismissal)  and  the  repercussions  for  the  employer  if  a  dismissal  is  found  to  be  unfair  (such  as 
compensation and reinstatement rights). Additional provisions exist in most OECD countries in the case of 
collective dismissals and typically include additional procedures for the employer. Employment protection 
also provides a regulatory framework for fixed-term and Temporary Work Agencies (TWA) contracts with 
respect to the types of work for which these contracts are allowed and their duration. It also includes 
regulations governing the establishment and operation of TWAs and requirements for agency workers to 
receive the same pay and/or conditions as equivalent workers in the user firm. 
  Employment  protection  can  be  specified  in  legislation,  collective  agreements  or  individual 
employment contracts. But its operation, in practice, also depends on the interpretation of rules by courts or 
tribunals and the effectiveness of enforcement. Ichino et al. (2003) and Bertola et al. (2000) suggest that 
jurisprudence may be affected by underlying labour market conditions; for instance, there is evidence that 
judges‟ decisions tend to be particularly favourable to workers when unemployment is high. Moreover, 
                                                       
3.   Bartelsman  et  al.  (2009)  and  Haltiwanger  et  al.  (2006)  are  among  the  few  exceptions  that  provide 
comparative studies of firm and job turnover.   4 
compensations for unfair dismissals can deviate largely from the minima set out by legislation because 
judges may account in their final decision for damages corresponding to past and future financial losses 
and  psychological  damages.  There  are  also  very  large  differences  across  sectors  and  countries  in  the 
number of cases brought to labour courts, the percentage of cases won by workers and the length of the 
legal procedure. With few exceptions, information on enforcement is generally scattered (see Venn, 2009). 
Therefore, cross-country comparable quantitative measures of the degree of stringency of employment 
protection that are available in the literature are essentially limited to mandatory legislative restrictions 
governing  recruitments  and  dismissals.  In  this  paper,  we  review  the  empirical  evidence  relating 
employment protection to job and worker flows and productivity, relying upon the well-known and widely 
used OECD indicators of the strictness of employment protection (see Venn, 2009).
4 
  Figure 1 presents the summary indicators of the stringency of employment protection in the 
OECD countries for 2008. It also disaggregates the summary indicator into three sub-indicators referring 
to: employment protection for individual dismissal of regular workers; additional provisions in case of 
collective dismissal of regular workers; and employment protection for temporary workers. The Figu re 
clearly shows  considerable variation in the stringency of EP   across OECD countries.  The strictest 
employment protection is found in Turkey, Luxembourg and Mexico, while the least strict is in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand . There are few or no restrictions on the use of 
temporary contracts in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In contrast, in Turkey and Mexico, temporary agency 
work is non-regulated and fixed-term contracts can only be used in limited circumstances. Spain, Greece 
and France also have strict rules  governing the circumstances  under which  temporary employment is 
allowed, along with limits on the number of successive contracts and their maximum duration. There is 
relatively little cross-country variation in the level of additional regulation of collective dismissals.  
                                                       
4.   The OECD employment protection indicators have been  widely used in empirical analyses and policy 
debates. But they are not without critics (see Addison and Teixeira, 2003, for a review). The construction 
of composite indicators designed to measure qualitative features of the legal system inevitably involves 
some selection and use of judgment. In particular, higher weights are given to some sub-components than 
others to reflect their relative economic importance when firms are making decisions about hiring and 
firing workers (see Venn, 2009 for the weights used). In order to test the sensitivity of country rankings to 
the weights used, Venn (2009) recalculated the summary indicator using different weights and found that 
the cross-country rankings were robust to the use of different weights.  In any event, detailed information 
on  all  sub-components  is  provided  on  the  OECD  employment  protection  website 
(www.oecd.org/employment/protection ) to allow users to see how the indicators were constructed and, if 
desired, reconstruct their own version based on alternative weights or aggregation methods.    5 

























































































































































































































































Protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal
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The EP indicators go from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent).  
Source: OECD employment protection database; www.oecd.org/employment/protection. 
  Over the past two decades, most OECD countries have reformed their system of employment 
protection mainly to increase the adaptability of their labour markets in response to growing pressures from 
globalisation and rapid technological changes. However, as shown in Figure 2, most of the regulatory 
changes have focused on easing regulations governing temporary contracts. In particularly, this was the 
dominant  tendency  in  the  1990s,  with  nine  OECD  countries  deregulating  employment  protection  for 
temporary workers, while only three eased regulations for permanent workers. In the 2000s, the picture is 
more diverse, with eight countries further easing regulations on temporary contracts, but five strengthening 
protection for these contracts also in response to what was perceived as an excessive use of these contracts. 
At the same time, four countries eased regulations for regular contracts. Across the board, only Portugal (in 
2008 in particular) and Spain (in the 1990s) eased regulations on both regular and temporary contracts –
 both from very high levels – and Japan – from relatively low levels.     6 
Figure 2. Changes in the strictness of employment protection in OECD countries 
Panel B. Late 1990s to 2008
Panel A. Late 1980s to late 1990s
a
Note: Countries are ranked from left to right in ascending order of the overall EP indicator in the late 1980s (late 
1990s when 1980s data are not available).
a) Data for the late 1980s are not available for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
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  The  key  issue  now  is  to  assess  the  possible  links  between  employment  protection  and  its 
changing  levels  and  components  over  time  and  across  countries  to  labour  market  dynamics,  i.e.  the 
reallocation of jobs and workers across sectors and firms and, in turn, assess the extent to which such 
dynamics have had implications for productivity growth. This is the task of the subsequent sections of the 
paper.   7 
2.  Reallocation of jobs and workers is sizeable in all countries  
  How sizeable are job and worker flows? To shed light on this question, we focus first on labour 
mobility across sectors and then, more importantly, across firms. In the decade prior to the global financial 
crisis of 2008-09, total OECD employment grew on average by about one half of a percentage point per 
year. This aggregate figure hides, however, significant differences across industries and, in particular, 
across firms, within each industry as a result of a continuous process of structural adjustment (see e.g. 
OECD,  2003,  Bartelsman  et  al.  2009).  For example,  using  a  decomposition  of  the  business sector  in 
20 industries, the absolute net rate of industry employment change, be it positive or negative, was on 
average about 4% per year, depending on the period and countries considered (OECD, 2009). Since the 
corresponding average net employment growth in the business sector was about 1 percentage point, this 
suggests that each year, on average, about 3% of jobs are destroyed in some industries, while an equal 
number of jobs are created in others. In other words, reallocation of labour resources across industries is 
three times as large as net aggregate employment growth. 
  But sizeable net employment changes at the industry level hide much greater churning at the firm 
level. To shed some light on overall labour mobility, we focus on both firm-level job reallocation – that is 
job creation and destruction by firms – and worker reallocation – that is hires and separations of workers. 
For this purpose, internationally harmonised datasets on job and worker flows are used. Data on job flows 
by country and industries are taken from Haltiwanger et al. (2006). These datasets are constructed using 
the  same  protocol  from  either  business  registers  or  tax  files  and  are  therefore  comparable  (see  also 
Bartelsman et al., 2009) and refer to firms as the units of observation.
5 Data on worker flows are derived 
from employment and tenure figures obtained from individual micro -data available in national  Labour 
Force Surveys.
6 As the industry-level information of labour force survey data can be imprecise, these data 
are further harmonised on the basis of industry-level EU KLEMS employment data when possible, in order 
to ensure comparability over time at the industry level. 
  In this paper, job creation is the sum of  net employment growth at all entering and expanding 
firms; job destruction is the total number of jobs lost at  exiting and contracting firms;  net employment 
growth is the difference between job creation and job destruction; and  job reallocation is the sum of job 
creation and destruction. The definition of worker reallocation  follows the approach  used by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999) that  is based on the comparison of worker statuses at two different points in time ; 
hence, hirings are defined as the number of workers who are with the firm at time t, but were not with that 
employer at time t-1; and separations as the number of workers who were with the firm at t-1, but not at t. 
Market and technological forces drive job and worker turnover across industries, but institutions and 
policy also play a significant role 
  The observed large job and worker reallocation flows are largely driven by market characteristics 
and technological changes. There is also a strong cross-country correlation of the industry distributions of 
job and worker reallocation rates.
7 This evidence points to the fact that common industry-specific factors – 
                                                       
5 .  The firm is defined here (as well as in the studies referred to above) as “an organizational unit producing 
goods or services which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the 
allocation of its current resources” (see Bartelsman et al., 2009) . 
6 .  Hiring data are derived directly from tenure data, while separations data are estimated as the difference 
between hirings and employment growth (see OECD, 2009). 
7.  See Bassanini and Marianna (2009).    8 
including technological progress, market conditions and demand factors – are important drivers of job and 
worker reallocation.
8 
  Despite these common industry-level patterns of job and worker flows, there remain significant 
differences across countries, which are largely driven by differences in economic structure of the countries 
and the characteristics of the firms within different industries. Of course, both the industry composition of 
the different countries and the characteristics of firms are  partially endogenous, and possibly related to 
policies and institutions.  OECD (2009) suggests that between 30% and 40% of the cross -country/cross-
industry variation in job and worker reallocation rates is explained by country-specific effects. 
  Figure 3 presents estimates of labour reallocation – both job and worker flows – once differences 
in the economic structure (i.e. industry composition) are taken into account (see OECD, 2009 for more 
details).
9 Average annual gross job reallocation was about 22% of dependent employment in the business 
sector between 1997 and 2004 (Panel A). The Figure also presents estimates of the so-called “excess job 
reallocation”, i.e. the difference between gross job reallocation and the absolute value of net employment 
growth in each industry. This indicator accounts for the reallocation of labour resources between firms 
within the same industry. At 18% of dependent employment on average, excess job reallocation implies 
that about 9% of all jobs were destroyed in some firms but this was offset by an equal number of jobs 
created in other firms within the same industry every year.
10 From an accounting perspective, this is almost 
three times as much as the number of jobs that were created or destroyed on average in each industry due 
to net employment growth and the reallocation of labour resources across industries.
11  
                                                       
8.   Haltiwanger et al. (2006) also show that, within each industry, differences in the size composition of firms 
play a key role in explaining aggregate job flows in all OECD countries.   
9.  These include ten OECD countries (Estonia,  Finland, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Portugal,  Slovenia, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Brazil. 
10.  Excess job reallocation would be smaller if a finer industry disaggregation were employed. However, the 
literature has shown that excess reallocation remains large in comparison with net employment growth 
even within narrowly defined industries (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). Put another way, growing and 
contracting firms coexist in the same industry, no matter how narrowly the latter is defined. 
11.   Similar findings are reported by Haltiwanger et al. (2006), the only cross-country comparative study in the 
literature based on internationally harmonised data on job flows.   9 
Figure 3. There are significant cross-country differences in job and worker reallocation rates across all 
industries 
Note: Estimated average rates that would be observed in each country if it had the same industry composition of the average country. Job
flows: Brazil: 1998-2000; Estonia: 2003; Germany: 1997-98; Finland: 1997; Hungary: 1998-2000; Portugal: 1997; Mexico: 2000; Slovenia: 2002-
03; Sweden: 1997-2003; United Kingdom: 1997-98; United States: 2001-04. Worker flows: Czech Republic: 2002-05; Ireland: 2000-03; Norway:
2000-04; Poland: 2004-05; Slovak Republic: 2003-05; Switzerland: 2002-07; Turkey: 2007; United States, 2000, 2002 and 2004; other countries:
2000-05.
Source: OECD (2009).
Country averages of job and worker reallocation rates expressed in percentages and adjusted by industry composition
Panel A. Job reallocation and excess job reallocation, 1997-2004
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  The turnover of workers is even greater than that of jobs. Available data for 22 OECD countries,
 
based on micro-data from labour force surveys and other sources, suggest that annual worker reallocation 
(i.e.  the  sum  of  hirings  and  separations)  averaged  across  industries,  was  about  33%  of  dependent 
employment  during  2000-05  (Panel B).  Of  this,  industry-level  excess  worker  reallocation  (i.e.  the 
difference between total worker reallocation in each industry and the absolute value of industry-level net 
employment growth) was about 30% of dependent employment. This implies that, each year, on average 
almost 15% of all job matches were destroyed but were offset by new matches with other firms and/or with 
other workers within the same industry. 
  Having shown that job and worker turnover rates are large across all OECD countries and over 
time, it is of importance to assess their role in promoting a better allocation of labour and, ultimately, 
productivity and economic growth. The next two sections will examine this possible link, first from a 
theoretical perspective and then empirically.    10 
3.  What are  the  theoretical  links  between  employment  protection, labour  reallocation and 
productivity? 
  Employment  protection  is  generally  justified  by  the  need  to  protect  workers  from  unfair 
behaviour on the part of their employer and the fact that imperfections in financial markets limit their 
ability to insure themselves against the risk of dismissal (see e.g. Pissarides, 2010). However, by imposing 
implicit  or  explicit  costs  on  the  firm‟s  ability  to  adjust  its  workforce  to  optimal  levels,  employment 
protection may hinder efficient workforce adjustment, reducing job separations but also discouraging job 
creation (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) with an overall dampening effect on labour reallocation. In 
theory, the potential inefficiencies in the optimal allocation of labour generated by EP can be offset by 
private transfers as indicated by Lazear (1990). For example, firing costs imposed on firms may be passed 
onto workers via lower wages or obliging them to post performance bond, without necessarily affecting 
labour demand. However, in practice, wage setting mechanisms and financial market imperfections as well 
as the uncertainty future firm performance may weaken these mechanisms. Most equilibrium models of the 
labour market (e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990) suggest that in the presence of positive 
firing costs, the optimal firm strategy is to reduce both job creation and destruction, with an ambiguous 
effect on average employment levels. Moreover, EP, by raising labour adjustment costs, may also slow the 
reallocation  of  resources  from  declining  industries  to  growing  industries  and  may  have  negative 
implications for aggregate economic and labour market outcomes. At the same time, it should be stressed 
that some degree of job protection, by promoting job stability, may encourage work commitment and 
investment in firm-specific human capital (see e.g. Akerlof, 1984; Soskice, 1997; Belot et al. 2007; Pierre 
and  Scarpetta,  2004).  In  turn,  such  investment  in  human  capital  could  have  positive  impacts  on 
productivity and real wage growth.  
  The theoretical links between the stringency of regulation on temporary contracts and labour 
mobility are more straightforward. In particular, asymmetric liberalisation of temporary contracts while 
leaving in place stringent regulations for permanent contracts – as observed in many, mainly European 
countries, over the past two decades  (see Figure 2) – is expected to push firms to substitute temporary for 
regular workers. Potentially, this will have no long-run effect on overall employment, as the smaller costs 
involved with the termination of temporary contracts will compensate for the higher costs associated with 
the termination of regular contracts (see e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Bentolila et al., 2008). But a shift 
from  regular  to  temporary  employment  may  distort  the  optimal  composition  of  employment,  reduce 
workers‟ involvement in training, etc.
12 Moreover, those who are able to maintain a regular contract (often 
the insiders) will enjoy an even higher level of job security, potentially raising their wage claims (Bentolila 
and Dolado, 1994). In contrast, those  employed on temporary contracts (often youths and other workers 
with little work experience or low skills) will bear the brunt of employment adjustment (Saint Paul, 1996). 
This latter phenomenon has been very marked in the recent great recession, when a number of European 
countries and Japan, characterized by large shares of temporary workers in total employment, have seen 
job losses largely concentrated among these workers (see OECD, 2010).     
  What are the effects of strict EP on productivity and overall economic growth? To the extent EP 
raises the costs of workforce adjustments and/or distorts the optimal composition of employment between 
temporary and regular contracts, it is likely to have a negative impact on  the efficient allocation of labour 
and, ultimately, on productivity growth. In this context, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), using a general 
equilibrium model, show that a tax on job destruction reduces the pace of workforce adjustment with a 
negative effect on productivity. Poschke (2007) stresses the importance of firing costs  in the selection of 
                                                       
12.   Indeed, the evidence suggests that temporary workers are less likely to participate in job-related training 
(e.g. Albert et al., 2005; Bassanini et al., 2007) and tend to provide less effort when the probability of 
conversion of their contract into open-ended relationships is low (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008), although they 
might be more motivated when the latter is high (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005).   11 
the most efficient firms and the exit decision of low-productivity firms, while Samaniego (2006) focuses 
on the impact of firing restrictions on the industry composition of the economy. Stringent firing costs, by 
discouraging  investment  in  activities  that  require  frequent  changes  in  the  workforce,  including  those 
characterized  by  rapid  technological  changes  (e.g.  ICT),  may  dampen  aggregate  productivity  growth. 
Along similar lines, Bartelsman et al. (2004) suggest that stringent firing restrictions might discourage 
firms from experimenting with new technologies, characterized by higher mean returns but also higher 
variance, in order to avoid the risk of paying high firing costs.
13 
4.  What role does labour reallocation play for productivity growth? 
  The  availability  for  a  growing  number  of  OECD  and  emerging  economies  of  harmonised 
firm-level data has allowed for comparative analyses of the links between job reallocation and productivity 
growth. In particular, several papers have used static and dynamic accounting decompositions to show that 
jobs are reallocated from firms with below-average labour productivity to firms with above-average labour 
productivity (see e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996; Griliches and Regev, 1995; Foster et al., 2001; Disney et al., 
2003; Baldwin and Gu, 2006; Bartelsman et al., 2004).  
  Olley and Pakes (1996) have proposed a simple cross-sectional decomposition of productivity, 
whereby the level of productivity P for a sector at a point in time can be decomposed as follows: 
     
i






P , , ,
1
  
where N is the number of businesses in the sector, θi,t is the market share of firm i and Δ is the operator that 
represents the cross-sectional deviation of the firm-level measure from the industry simple average. The 
simple interpretation of this decomposition is that aggregate productivity can be decomposed into two 
terms: i) the un-weighted average of firm-level productivity; and ii) a cross term that reflects the cross-
sectional efficiency of the allocation of resources. Olley and Pakes (OP) found that the covariance term 
(using a decomposition of industry Total Factor Productivity, TFP) increased substantially in the U.S. 
telecommunications equipment industry following the deregulation of the sector in the early 1980s. They 
argued that this was because the deregulation permitted outputs and inputs to be reallocated more readily 
from less productive to more productive firms. Bartelsman et al. (2004) found that the OP covariance term 
for  labour  productivity  averaged  about  50  log  points  within  U.S.  manufacturing  industries:  in  an 
accounting sense, this implies that the index of labour productivity in the average U.S. manufacturing 
industry was 50 percent higher than it would be if employment shares were randomly allocated within 
industries. However, the OP covariance term only averaged 20-30 log points in Western Europe and it was 
close to zero, if not negative, in Central and Eastern European countries at the beginning of their transition 
to a market economy. However, it was noticeable that the covariance term increased substantially in these 
latter countries during the 1990s, as their transition towards a market economy progressed.  
  From a dynamic perspective, several approaches have been proposed to decompose aggregate 
productivity growth into components that reflect the contributions of within-firm growth, the firm turnover 
process  and  the  reallocation  of  resources,  including  labour,  across  continuing  firms.  One  of  these 
approaches,  originally  proposed  by  Baily  et  al.  (1992)  and  then  modified  by  Foster  et  al.  (2001), 
decomposes aggregate (or industry-level) labour productivity growth into five components, commonly 
called the within effect that captures within-firm productivity growth; the between-firm effect that captures 
the gains in aggregate productivity coming from the expanding market of high-productivity firms, or from 
                                                       
13.   Bartelsman et al. (2004) show that the dispersion of productivity among young businesses and businesses 
that actively change their technology is wider in the United States than in Germany, where firing costs are 
higher.   12 
low-productivity firms‟ shrinking market shares; the cross effect that reflects gains in productivity from 
high-productivity growth firms‟ expanding shares or from low-productivity growth firms‟ shrinking shares; 
and  the  entry  and  exit  effects  that  account  for  the  differences  between  entering  (and  exiting)  firm‟s 
productivity and initial productivity in the industry, weighted by their market share.  
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where Δ means changes over the k-years‟ interval between the first year (t − k) and the last year (t); θi,t is as 
before;  C,  N,  and  X  are  sets  of  continuing,  entering,  and  exiting  firms,  respectively;  and  Pt-k  is  the 
aggregate (i.e., weighted average) productivity level of the sector in the first year (t − k). The method uses 
the first year‟s values for a continuing firm‟s employment share (θit-k), its labour productivity level (Pit-k) 
and the sector-wide average productivity level (Pt-k).  
  These  decompositions  suggest  that,  across  all  OECD  countries  for  which  suitable  data  are 
available,  labour  productivity  growth  is  largely  driven  by  within-firm  performance.  However,  the 
reallocation of resources across existing enterprises also plays a sizeable role. Moreover, while the exit of 
unprofitable firms always contributes to raise aggregate labour productivity growth, the role of entry varies 
more across countries and sectors. However, in the more technologically-advanced sectors, the entry of 
new innovative firms has a positive and often large effect on productivity growth (Bartelsman et al. 2004). 
Figure 4 presents the contribution of net entry – the sum of the entry and exit effect for the manufacturing 
sector  in  a  group  of  OECD  countries  with  comparable  data.  It  shows  that  the  process  of  creative 
destruction accounts for a sizeable share of total labour productivity growth, ranging from a low of under 
15 percent to a high of 45 percent. 
  OECD (2009) sheds further light on the link between job reallocation and firm-level productivity 
by  exploiting  firm-level  data  for  a  sample  of  the  European  countries.  It  provides  further  supporting 
evidence that job flows among continuing firms effectively reallocate labour resources from less efficient 
to more efficient firms. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between employment changes and a firm‟s 
efficiency level at the beginning of the period, even after controlling for firm heterogeneity.
14 This result 
holds whether efficiency is proxied by labour productivity  – consistent  with most  of the  literature  on 
dynamic accounting decompositions – or by TFP measures.  
  Overall, both productivity decomposition analyses and regression analyses provide convincing 
evidence of the important roles played by job reallocation, through the process of creative destruction and 
adjustments across continuing firms, in allocating efficiently resources and promoting productivity growth 
in  the  economy.  The  next  step  is  to  assess  whether  empirically  there  is  a  link  between  employment 
protection and labour reallocation.  
                                                       
14.    The empirical analysis controls for firm age, detailed firm-size classes, detailed geographical area, detailed 
industry and common time shocks.     13 
Figure 4. The effect of net entry on total labour productivity growth 
Note:  data show the sum of the contributions from new entrant firms and exiting firms to total labor
productivity growth in manufacturing.  Data cover different periods for the countries.  
For all but Hungary, the contributions are calculated on the basis of five-year rolling windows.
For Hungary, data refer to three-year rolling windows and therefore
tend to under-estimate the contribution of new firms to the total.
Source: Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009). 











(in % of total productivity growth)
 
5.  What are the links between employment protection and labour mobility? 
  There is a growing empirical literature that investigates the impact of EP on job  and worker 
flows. One strand of the literature focuses on specific country case-studies exploiting regulatory reforms or 
differential  treatment  of  workers  or  firms.  Autor  et al.  (2007)  analyse  the  impact  of  the  adoption  of 
wrongful-discharge protection norms by state courts in the United States on several firms‟ performance 
indicators.  They  exploit  differences  across  US  states  in  the  timing  of  adopting  stricter  job  security 
provisions and find a negative effect of these provisions on firm entry rates and job flows. Boeri and 
Jimeno (2005) exploit exemption clauses exonerating small Italian firms from job security provisions: their 
estimates confirm a significant effect of employment protection on job turnover and job destruction, in 
particular. Schivardi and Torrini (2008), using an Italian matched employer-employee dataset, find similar 
results as do Kugler and Pica (2008) who assess the effect of a reform in Italy in 1990 that increased firing 
restrictions for small firms. Along the same lines, Kugler et al. (2010) look at the effects of a reform in 
Spain  in  1997,  which  lowered  dismissal  costs  for  older  and  younger  workers,  and  find  that  it  was 
associated with a relative increase in worker flows for these groups. Finally, Venn (2010) explores the 
impact on hirings of a recent reform of dismissal costs in Turkey that had a different application to small 
and large firms and reports large negative effects on the most affected firms.
15  
  It is often difficult to generalise  the results  from these country case-studies as the nature and 
extent of the reforms often vary significantly , as do the underlying labour market and overall economic 
conditions in the countries under review. In this context, a second strand of the empirical literature has 
exploited cross-country  datasets,  using either aggregate data   or cross-country comparable micro data. 
                                                       
15.   It should be stressed, however, that a few micro studies find no impact of dismissal regulations on job or 
worker flows. Bauer et al. (2007) look at changes of small-firm exemption thresholds on worker turnover 
using  German  matched  employer-employee  data  and  find  that  such  exemptions.  Similarly,  procedural 
requirements for dismissal have not been found to have a significant effect on hiring or firing in exempted 
firms  in  Portugal  (Martins,  2009)  and  Sweden  (von  Below  and  Thoursie,  2010),  perhaps  because  of 
the small economic significance of these specific exemptions.    14 
Using aggregate data for a panel of 13 European countries over the 1990s, Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) find 
a negative impact of employment protection for temporary contracts on job-to-job transitions but no impact 
of provisions for regular workers. Using the European firm-level data, Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004) find a 
negative effect of employment protection on job reallocation, after controlling for the effect of other labour 
market institutions. Using similar data, Messina and Vallanti (2007) find that strict employment protection 
significantly reduces job destruction in downturns with mild effects on job creation. The negative impact 
of employment protection on job reallocation, job creation and job destruction is found to be larger in 
downsizing industries and where firms cannot achieve substantial reductions in employment levels purely 
by relying on voluntary quits.  
  Aggregate studies that exploit over-time variation in job flows and regulations tend to suffer from 
serious  endogeneity  and  omitted-variable  biases.  A  few  recent  studies  have  exploited  within-country 
variations in the expected impact of EP using difference-in-difference econometric techniques. The main 
findings of two of these studies, OECD (2010) and Haltiwanger et al. (2010), are reviewed below.  
A strong estimated effect of EP for regular workers on worker flows 
  OECD (2010) presents an empirical analysis of worker flows using industry-level data (averaged 
over the period 2000-07) for 24 business-sector industries and 24 OECD countries. The study focuses on 
EP for regular contracts (including additional restrictions for collective dismissals) and adopts a difference-
in-difference estimation procedure. The latter relies on the assumption that employment protection has a 
potentially stronger impact on firms‟ behaviour – and thus on worker flows -- in industries that tend to 
have, in the absence of regulation, a greater need to adjust their workforce because of technological and 
market factors. In particular, the industry-level propensity to worker reallocation in the United States, the 
least  regulated  country  as  judged  by  the  OECD  indicators  of  employment  protection,  is  used  as  a 
benchmark to proxy for the technological and market-driven differences in  worker reallocation in the 
absence of policy-induced adjustment costs. The advantage of this approach compared to standard cross-
country/cross-industry empirical studies is that it exploits within-country differences between industries 
based  on  the  interaction  between  country  and  industry  characteristics.  Thus,  the  approach  allows 
controlling for country and industry effects.
16  
  The empirical results in OECD (2010) suggest  that EP on regular contracts has a statistically 
significant negative direct effect on worker reallocation – once the impact of demographic characteristics 
and the share of temporary workers have been controlled for.
17 A one-point increase in the OECD index of 
EP stringency for regular workers  – roughly corresponding to two-thirds of the difference between the 
OECD average and the country with the lowest value of the EP index (United States) – appears to reduce, 
on  average,  total  worker  reallocation  by  between  5.2  and  6.7  percentage  points,  depending  on  the 
specification adopted. Similarly, the same variation in EP stringency is estimated to reduce separation rates 
by between 3 and 3.6 percentage points, and hiring rates by between 2.2 and 3 percentage points.  
  However, it should be noted that these results do not take into account any effect of EP for 
regular workers‟ reallocation arising from any impact of EP on temporary workers.  Figure 5 presents the 
estimated effects of a  one-point reduction in EP for regular workers,  on both the share of temporary 
workers (between 3.2 and 4.2 percentage points) and, taking into account also direct effects, on overall 
                                                       
16.   Alternative benchmark measures of this propensity are also considered, including UK reallocation rates, 
US dismissal rates, and the predicted value of reallocation when the EP index is equal to zero, estimated on 
the basis of all countries in the sample (see Bassanini et al., 2010, for more discussion of data, estimation 
methods and detailed results). 
17.   Controlling for the share of temporary contracts allows estimating the effect of EP on the reallocation of 
workers on permanent contracts.    15 
worker reallocation (between 2.9 and 3.6 percentage points).
18 These are large effects, although it should 
be stressed that, as shown above, a one-point change of the index corresponds to an unusually large policy 
change from a historical perspective. From a different perspective, these estimated effects would imply that 
EP for regular workers (including additional restrictions on collective dismissals) explains more than 20% 
of the cross-country variation in gross worker reallocation, as measured by standard deviations in the 
respective distributions (adjusted for industry composition in the latter case).
19  While this implies a 
non-negligible role for EP in explaining the large cross-country variation in labour reallocation, it does of 
course not mean that other factors are not also at play, including differences in  regulations affecting the 
internal flexibility of firms, different returns to job tenure, technology shocks etc.      
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Based  on  difference-in-difference  OLS  estimates.  Estimates  are  obtained  by  assuming  that,  in  each  industry,  the  impact  of 
employment protection is greater, the greater the US reallocation rate for that industry. The overall impact on total worker reallocation 
is the algebraic sum of the impact of the direct impact and the indirect one that occurs through the share of temporary contracts, 
simultaneously  estimated.  All  specifications  control  for  the  shares  of  age  groups.  Estimates  are  based  on  24  business-sector 
industries for 23 OECD countries. Data are averaged over the period 2000-07.  
For each dependent variable, minimum and maximum indicate the smallest and greatest estimate (in absolute terms), respectively, 
obtained in different specifications, of the average effect of a one-point increase from the OECD average in the EP index for regular 
workers (including additional restrictions for collective dismissals).  
**, ***: statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: OECD (2010). 
Employment protection affects, in particular, job-to-job transitions  
  The empirical analysis provided in OECD (2010) also allows distinguishing between different 
types of worker transition, with reference to both hirings and separations, as well as movement within and 
across industries. Figure 6 presents the estimated effects of employment protection for individual and 
collective dismissals for the different transition paths. tt suggests that EP has a strong and statistically 
significant effect mainly on job-to-job separations, with little or no impact on job-to-jobless separations. 
This could be taken as evidence that, at least in normal times, those workers who may end up being 
displaced in the aftermath of a reform easing EP for regular workers but would not have been displaced 
                                                       
18 .  In principle, this statement should refer only to partial-equilibrium labour demand effects.  
19.   These results are robust to various sensitivity checks; see Bassanini et al. (2010) for more details.   16 
without the reform, are likely to find another job within a relatively short period of time. This result might 
not hold, of course, in a major downturn – like in the recent great recession – when congestion in the 
labour market may lead to longer spells of joblessness.  
  Moreover, flexibility-enhancing EP reforms appear to be entirely associated with more frequent 
transitions within the same sector, which are typically associated with greater wage premia in the case of 
voluntary job changes and lower wage penalties in the case of displacement. By contrast, the impacts on 
job-to-job and jobless-to-job hirings are not significantly different (even though both are negative and 
significant),  which  suggests  that  more  flexible  EP  regulations  facilitate  the  transition  from  non-
employment to employment. 
Figure 6. The impact of regulation for individual and collective dismissals on worker reallocation, 


















































































































Note: Based on difference-in-difference OLS estimates. Average effect of a one-point increase from the OECD average in the indexes 
for each EP for regular workers (including additional restrictions on collective dismissals). Estimates are obtained by assuming that, in 
each industry, the impact of employment protection is greater, the greater the US reallocation rate for that industry. Estimates are 
based on 24 business-sector industries in a large sample of OECD countries, except Slovenia and Turkey. The specification controls 
for the shares of age groups and of temporary workers. Data are averaged over the period 2000-07. 
**,*: statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: OECD (2010). 
EP affects both a firm’s decision to enter or exit the market, as well as the reallocation of labour among 
continuing businesses 
  Haltiwanger et al. (2010) exploit the same difference-in-difference estimation procedure using 
harmonised job flow data for a sample of OECD and emerging economies. Their data allow distinguishing 
between job creation and destruction of firms of different sizes and between job creation due to the entry of 
new firms and job destruction due to the exit of unprofitable companies. Their results support strongly the 
OECD findings of a marked effect of EP on job reallocation. In particular, their estimates suggests that, if 
countries with the most stringent employment protection (in the top 10% of the distribution)  were to 
reform EP toward that of the least regulated countries (bottom 10%), they could experience an increase in 
job  reallocation  of  almost  one-half  in  the  most  dynamic  sectors  (i.e.  those  with  highest  flexibility 
requirement).    17 
  Haltiwanger  et  al.  (2010)  also  shed  light  on  the  effects  of  EP  on  the  different  margins  of 
reallocation, namely  on job  flows  due to the entry  and  exit of firms  in  the market  and  those  due  to 
reallocation among incumbents. This is important because, as stressed above, one of the key drivers of 
productivity growth is the process of creative destruction, with the entry of new firms and the exit of 
unproductive ones. Their results suggest that while both negative and statistically significant, the effect of 
employment protection on labour mobility is stronger on the entry/exit margin than on the reallocation of 
labour among incumbents. This suggests that overly-strict employment protection tends to dampen the 
process  of  creative  destruction  with  potentially  particularly  damaging  effects  on  the  most  dynamic 
segments of the economy.    
  Overall,  their  results  confirm  the  importance  of  employment  protection  in  shaping  labor 
adjustment patterns, particularly so in those industries and size classes where technological and market 
factors  require  more  frequent  employment  changes. Controlling  for  other regulations  influencing  firm 
behavior does not significantly alter their results.     
6.  What are the links between employment protection and productivity? 
  Given the well-established empirical links between EP to labour mobility and, in turn, between 
labour mobility and productivity, the next obvious question is see whether there is also evidence in the data 
of an effect of EP on productivity. While the evidence from country-level studies is rather inconclusive 
(see OECD, 2007 for a review), a number of recent cross-country studies have found consistent evidence 
of a negative effect of EP on productivity. Autor et al. (2007) also use their data on differences across the 
US states in the timing of adopting stricter job security provisions to assess the impact on investment and 
productivity (see above for a discussion on their estimated effect on job flows). They find a positive effect 
on capital investment and a negative effect on TFP growth. Cingano et al. (2008) reach similar conclusions 
using Italian data to examine a 1990 reform that raised dismissal costs for firms with fewer than 15 
employees only. Micco and Pages (2006) also found some weak evidence of a relationship between EP and 
labour productivity, using a difference-in-differences approach on a cross-section of industry-level data for 
several OECD and non-OECD countries.
20 
  OECD (2007) and the revised analysis in Bassanini et al. (2009) provide the most comprehensive 
analysis of the impact of EP on labour productivity and TFP growth. In particular, exploiting industry-level 
data for  a  sample  of  19  industries in  11-16  OECD  countries  over the  1982-2003  period  and using  a 
difference-in-difference approach (see above), they found robust evidence that labour productivity and TFP 
growth tend to be weaker in industries with greater layoff propensity, the more stringent the level of EP. 
From this result they also derive an estimate of the impact of EP on aggregate productivity growth that 
takes into account that, given the empirical approach adopted, EP mainly affects industries with high job 
turnover  propensity.  Their  estimates  suggest  that  a  one-point  EP  easing  for  regular  workers  (roughly 
corresponding to half of the difference between the OECD average and the country with the lowest value 
of  the  EP  index)  could  translate  into  an  aggregate  yearly  labour  productivity  growth  effect  of  0.14 
percentage points.
21 This is a sizeable effect if one considers that labour productivity growth averaged 1-
2.5 per cent in OECD countries over the past decade.   
                                                       
20.   However, their negative relationship between layoff costs and the level of labour productivity is not robust 
to changes in the country sample. 
21.  As  indicated  in  Bassanini  et  al.  (2009),  this  figure  is  a  lower-bound  estimate  as  it  is  based  on  the 
assumptions that the aggregate productivity effect is coming only from the impact on EP-binding industries 
and that EP has no impact on industry composition (between EP-binding and non-binding industries). In 
their analysis, EP-binding industries are those industries that appear to have layoff rates above the average 
in all years, so that, in the base sample of nineteen industries, only six of them – accounting, on average, 
for about 25% of total value added – appear to meet this criteria.        18 
7.  Do worker benefits from more flexible job security provision?  
On  average,  workers  benefit  from  labour  mobility  because  of  better  job  matching  and  stronger 
productivity growth 
  While there is ample evidence of the importance of labour reallocation for productivity growth 
and, in turn, of the impact of employment protection in shaping the magnitude and overall efficiency of 
labour reallocation, it is important to assess the impact that greater labour mobility would have on the 
involved workers. As stressed above, not all labour mobility promotes productivity growth. For example, 
OECD  (2010)  suggests  that  when  labour  mobility  is  largely  achieved  through  the  use  of  temporary 
contracts, leaving workers on permanent contracts largely untouched, it often leads to weaker accumulation 
of firm-specific human capital and weaker firm-level productivity growth. Secondly and more importantly, 
while some workers benefit from better job opportunities, others suffer from substantive losses in terms of 
post-displacement earnings and working conditions.  
  To shed some light on the effects of labour mobility on workers, OECD (2010) uses individual 
longitudinal  data  from  the  European  Community  Household  Panel  to  assess  the  wage  premia  to  job 
changes, controlling for individual heterogeneity (see OECD, 2010 for details). It shows that wage premia 
related to job changes are positive and significant in two-thirds of the OECD countries: on average, wage 
premia were around 3 per cent across the different European countries (see Figure 7).  
Figure 7. Average wage premia to job change, 1995-2001 
Source: OECD (2010). 
Note: Percentage-point estimated average differences between wages at the new and previous jobs (see OECD, 2010
for the list of countries), based on wage and salary employees only. Voluntary job changes occur when the reason to
stop the previous job is that the worker obtained a better / more suitable job. An involuntary job change occurs when
the reason why the worker stopped the previous job was: either obliged to stop by employer or end of temporary

























  There  is  also  some  evidence  that  the  unemployed  or  those  with  limited  attachment  to 
employment,  benefit  from  a  more  dynamic  labour  market  (see  e.g. Petrongolo  and  Pissarides,  2008). 
OECD (2010) reports evidence suggesting that about 44% of all hires in one year concern jobless-to-job 
hires, i.e. movements of individuals who were unemployed or out of the labour force into employment.    19 
  How does employment protection affect the impact of labour mobility on workers? OECD (2010) 
sheds some light on this issue by extending the analysis of wage premia associated with job changes to 
include also the impact of employment protection for regular workers. It should be stressed at the outset 
that this analysis focuses on the individual effects on workers and does not account for potentially sizeable 
general-equilibrium effects. Bearing this caveat in mind, the results suggest that EP for regular workers has 
no significant effect on the average wage premium to a job change. At the same time, strict EP appears to 
have substantially larger negative effects on the wage premium to voluntary separations and on the wage 
penalty at re-employment to involuntary separations (see Bassanini et al., 2010). These results tentatively 
suggest  that,  overall,  EP  reforms,  by  promoting  greater  worker  mobility,  tend  to  create  more  job 
opportunities  for  those  in  employment  who  wish  to  search  for  better  jobs,  and,  conditional  on 
displacement, do not necessarily worsen job perspectives for displaced workers.  
  These estimated wage premia do not take into account the aggregate effects on workers stemming 
from the impact of greater labour reallocation on productivity growth and wage dynamics. As discussed in 
the previous section, recent studies have produced consistent evidence of the importance of labour market 
flexibility for aggregate productivity growth and the main transmission mechanism from EP to productivity 
is  likely  to  be  via  the  impact  of  EP  on  labour  reallocation.  Indeed,  given  the  key  role  that  labour 
reallocation plays for productivity growth and, in turn, the significant impact that employment protection 
has on labour reallocation, one can tentatively conclude that greater efficiency in the allocation of labour is 
the  main  enabling  channel  through  which  lighter  restrictions  on  dismissals  contribute  to  productivity 
growth. To the extent that EP reforms do not simultaneously reduce workers‟ bargaining power, thereby 
depressing  the  wage  share  of  value  added,  wage  and  salary  employees  will  benefit  from  greater 
productivity growth through higher wages. 
But greater labour mobility also implies a higher fraction of displaced workers who need adequate 
support 
  All in all, the empirical evidence suggests that workers tend to benefit from a more dynamic 
labour market that ensures better matches between their skills and employers‟ needs and from the fact that 
their wages will also reflect the productivity-enhancing effects of efficient labour reallocation. However, 
not all workers benefit from the dynamism of the labour market in the same way. Displaced workers tend 
to suffer from substantive losses in terms of post-displacement earnings and working conditions. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 7, while the average wage premium was almost 6 percentage points in the case of a 
voluntary job change, in the case of an involuntary separation wages after re-employment are, on average, 
about 1 percentage point smaller than what they would have been if the job match had not been destroyed. 
In addition, and consistent with the “scarring” effect of unemployment, the wage loss at re-employment 
was  about  twice  as  large  in  the  case  of  job-to-jobless  transitions,  no  matter  whether  voluntary  or 
involuntary.
22  To  the  extent  vulnerable  workers  – including  youth  and  the  low  skilled  –  are 
over-represented among those affected by labour mobility (see Figure 8) supporting policies to facilitate 
their re-integration into employment are a key component of an overall reform package that is aimed at 
strengthening efficiency in the allocation of labour but also pays due attention to equity considerations.  
  In  this  context,  it  is  of  key  importance  to  accompany  efficiency-enhancing  reforms  of 
employment protection with efforts to provide adequate income support to displaced workers coupled with 
                                                       
22.   These results are consistent with the empirical literature. Moreover, evidence from the United States (see 
e.g. Farber, 2003) points to the fact that displaced workers are more likely to end up in precarious jobs and, 
in general, tend to have much smaller earnings, once re-employed. Moreover, there is some evidence for 
the US, Canada and a number of European countries suggesting that these wage losses can persist for a 
number  of  years  after  diplacement  (e.g. Burda  and  Maertens,  2001;  OECD,  2003;  Houle  and  van 
Audenrode, 1995; Browning and Crossley, 2008).    20 
effective re-employment services to facilitate their reintegration into employment. This is important not 
only for equity but also for efficiency considerations. Indeed, OECD (2010) suggests that unemployment 
benefits appear to have a positive impact on average worker flows, with particularly strong effects on 
youth and young adults.   
Figure 8. Worker mobility is higher among young adults and low-qualified workers 
Note: Data are ranked in ascending order of worker reallocation rates. Adjusted reallocation rates are estimated average
rates that would be observed in each country if it had the same industry composition and individual characteristics as the
average country other than the characteristic of interest. Adjusted reallocation, hiring and separation rates are estimated
average rates observed across countries. The rates are based on 2002-2005 for the Czech Republic; 2000-2003 for Ireland;
2000-2004 for Norway; 2004-2005 for Poland; 2003-2005 for the Slovak Republic; 2002-2007 for Switzerland; 2007 for
Turkey; and 2000, 2002 and 2004 for the United States.
Source: OECD (2009).
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8.  Conclusions/Implications for policy 
 
  The on-going debate on labour market flexibility, its effects, whether policies should seek to 
influence it and in what forms, etc. assigns an important role to employment protection. This is hardly   21 
surprising when one considers the prominence assigned to EP in many theoretical models of the labour 
market and many empirical studies seeking to explain labour market performance across OECD countries.  
Much of the latter has focused on the possible impacts of EP on aggregate employment and unemployment 
rates and the evidence is mixed and hotly debated. 
  In this paper, we have sought to extend the debate on EP by focusing explicitly on its impacts on 
labour market dynamics, specifically how it is linked to worker and job flows, and how, in turn, this feeds 
into productivity growth.  We do this by summarizing the empirical evidence and, in particular, drawing 
extensively from recent OECD analyses of these key links. The upshot is that employment protection 
impacts  significantly  on  labour  market  flows  and  these  flows,  in  turn,  have  significant  impacts  on 
productivity  growth.  At  the  same  time,  the  evidence  also  shows  that  while  greater  labour  market 
reallocation benefits many workers through higher real wages and better careers, some displaced workers 
lose out via longer unemployment durations and/or lower real wages in post-displacement jobs. 
  So what do these findings imply for reforms of EP to boost productivity growth and future living 
standards?  First, OECD research for the Reassessed Jobs Strategy (RJS) of 2006 stresses that any such 
reforms  should  be  tackled  as  part  of  a  comprehensive  strategy,  not  viewed  as  an  end  in  itself.  A 
comprehensive  strategy  has  to  include  appropriate  macroeconomic  policies  to  deal  with  demand-side 
shocks – an important lesson from the recent Great Recession – and vigorous steps to strengthen product 
market competition. It should also seek to secure a new “flexicurity-type balance”, taking into account 
each country‟s specific starting points and institutions, in order to ensure that the benefits and costs of the 
reforms are equitably shared between workers, firms and taxpayers. 
  A key factor in any such flexicurity bargain should be a reasonably generous social safety net that 
is backed by an effective activation regime which assists benefit recipients to get back into work.  Such a 
cost-effective activation regime does need to be adapted to the specific circumstances of a steep downturn 
and  OECD  (2009,  2010)  highlights  some  of  the  elements  in  this  adaptation  and  how  countries  have 
responded to the jobs crisis and current recovery. 
  Finally,  what  might  be  desirable  features  of  EP  reform  as  part  of  such  a  comprehensive 
approach?  At  least  three  possible  reform  approaches  could  be  considered.    One,  which  has  been 
championed  by  a  group  of  European  economists  including  Pierre  Cahuc,  Francis  Kramarz,  Samuel 
Bentolila, Juan Dolado and Tito Boeri, is to move sharply away from a two-tier EP system of the type 
which exists in many (mostly European) countries today, with relatively strict EP for permanent workers 
and relatively lax EP for temporary workers. Instead, they call for a single EP contract, with firing costs 
being set at initially low levels and rising with firm tenure. A second type of reform owes its inspiration to 
the  Austrian  reform  of  2003  which  converted  uncertain  firing  costs  for  employers  into  a  system  of 
individual savings accounts, funded by an employer payroll tax. From the employer‟s perspective, this 
system guarantees certainty about the cost of any future dismissal at the time of hiring.  For the workers, 
costs associated with labour mobility are reduced because they do not lose their entitlement to severance 
pay when quitting to take a new job.
23 A third, more ad hoc type of reform would be tackle the asymmetry 
between temporary and permanent contracts more directly by relaxing the stringency of EP for the latter 
while at the same time increasing the degree of stringency for the former. 
  In sum, EP is an important feature of labour market adaptability. Its design and enforcement 
matter for turnover in the labour market which, in turn, has been shown to have significant impacts on 
productivity growth. But any reforms of EP should not be made in isolation; it should be assessed carefully 
and as part of a comprehensive reform package.   
                                                       
23.   In the Austrian system the payroll tax is fixed.  A more optimal version of this reform would experience-
rate the firm‟s payroll tax relative to its layoff rate.   22 
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